June
20, 2005
FBI & 9/11
By Sibel Edmonds
Over
four years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist
attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing
the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a
translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned
by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high- level
intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan.
Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin
Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting 4-5
major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the
individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the
United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months.
The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special
Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington
Field Office, by filing “302” forms, and the translator, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar,
translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the Special
Agent in Charge, Thomas Frields, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators
were told to ‘keep quiet’ regarding this issue. The translator who was
present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar,
reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the
Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and
in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004 stated that FBI
officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001, and
further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the
Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing (Please
refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr. Sarshar
reported this issue to the 9/11 Commission on February 12, 2004, and provided
them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the contact information
for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the
information. I provided the 9/11 Commission with a detailed and specific
account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen.
Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with
specific information regarding this case.
For
almost four years since September 11, officials refused to admit to having
specific information regarding the terrorists’ plans to attack the United
States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically
warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities
against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks the
Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the ‘use of airplanes’, ‘major US cities as targets’, and ‘Osama Bin Laden issuing the order.
’ Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been
provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI
Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in
Washington DC.
In
October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent
from (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI
Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This Special Agent,
in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering
his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues
involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could
prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this
document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and retranslated
verbatim, the field agent’s hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation
revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building
material for skyscrapers being sent overseas (country name omitted). It also
revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies
in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the
re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed,
the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike
Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the
Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send
this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the
original translation was accurate. This supervisor, Mike Feghali, stated that
sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would
cause problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting the
retranslation never received the accurate translation of that document. I
provided this information to the 9/11 Commission on February 12, 2004, and to
the Department of Justice Inspector General in May 2002.
The
latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information,
intelligence, within intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies.
To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of
intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its
direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not given to
or shared with Counterterrorism units, their investigations, and countering
terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to 9/11, and remains in
effect after 9/11. If Counterintelligence receives information that contains
money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly linked
to terrorist activities; and if that information involves certain nations,
certain semi- legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political
relations in this country, then, that information is not shared with
Counterterrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain
cases, frustrated FBI agents cited ‘direct pressure by the State
Department,’ and in other cases ‘sensitive diplomatic relations’
is cited. I provided the Department of Justice Inspector General and the 9/11
Commission with detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this
issue, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the
names of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities.
Now,
after almost 4 years, we get to hear new bits & pieces: FBI & Midhar’s
Case; FBI & Abdel-Hafiz Case; FBI & Saudi
planes leaving just days after 9/11 without having the passengers questioned;
FBI & Youssef Case;… and the list goes on.
Today,
after nearly four years since 9/11, the American people still do not know that
thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of ‘protecting
certain foreign business relations.’ The victims family members still do
not realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for
almost 4 years has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and
disguised under ‘safeguarding certain diplomatic relations .’
Where
is the so-called congressional oversight? Why has the 9/11 Commission intentionally
omitted this info; although they’ve had it all along? Where is accountability?